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Abstract 
 
The meaning of experience, knowledge and truth in Africa
1
 is dominated by the 
successive refinement of the colonial conception of education.  This dominant conception 
of education does in practice suppress and distort the African experience in general and, 
consequently constructs knowledge and truth at variance with the African experience.  This 
condition necessitates the rethinking of education in Africa.  The present essay is a 
contribution to this endeavor.  It will emphasize the distinction between learning and 
education and argue for an appropriate educational paradigm suited to the African 
condition. 
Introduction 
It is not the purpose here to traverse in elaborate detail the meaning of education 
propounded by philosophers such as Plato, Locke or Dewey.  A disquisition of this kind 
designed to clarify or enrich theory for its own sake is not part of the intention of the 
present writer.  Consonant with this intention, we will proceed by way of providing a 
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1
 The meaning of the term Africa is indeed contestable on at least two grounds. One is that the name Africa is 
not conferred by the indigenous peoples – conquered in the unjust wars of colonization – upon themselves. 
Another is that it does not by definition refer to the particular histories of the indigenous peoples – conquered 
in the unjust wars of colonization – inhabiting various parts of the continent from time immemorial. In his 
reflections upon the origin and meaning of the term Africa, Mazrui notes that it may be traced to the Berber 
or the Greco-roman ancestry. “But although the name Africa may have originally been either Semitic or 
Greco-Roman, the application of the name in more recent centuries has been due almost entirely to western 
Europe. … We should question Europe‟s decisions about boundaries of Africa and the identity of Africans … 
We have to accept the continental definition as presently defined internationally. But I personally regard the 
present boundaries of Africa as not only arbitrary but artificially conceived by European geographers in a 
former era of European dominance. For the purpose of this book I accept the Red Sea as one of Africa‟s 
boundaries – but I do so decidedly under protest”. Mazrui, A.A., (1986) The Africans, London: BBC 
Publications p. 25, 29 and 38 And so does the present author accept the term Africa decidedly under protest 
for the purpose of this essay. 
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stipulative definition of education.  This will be contrasted with the meaning of learning. 
The contrasting shall assume a deliberately philosophical perspective.  The philosophical 
perspective shall remain the underlying thread weaving together the various aspects of our 
unfolding argument.  Our core argument is that the prevailing theory and practice of 
education in Africa is dominated by successive and subtle refinements of the colonial 
conception of education.  The effect of this domination is to distort and suppress 
indigenous African ways of knowing and doing, thereby establishing and sustaining 
epistemological tension between the former and the dominant refined concept of education.   
One of the means to resolve this tension is to distinguish between learning and 
formal education.  The purpose of the distinction is to underline the irreducibility of 
experience as the source of learning as distinct from formal education.  The epistemology 
that arises from learning does not lend itself to an ineluctable construction of knowledge 
and formal education identical for all human beings, regardless of their embeddedness in a 
particular existential situation.  The disregard for embeddedness in a particular existential 
situation has enabled the colonial meaning of formal education to assume dominance and it 
is this dominance that is being questioned in this essay.  This questioning is in memory of 
the Resolution of the Pan African Congress held in Manchester, United Kingdom in 1945. 
The Resolution, being a “Declaration to the Colonial Powers” reads as follows: 
We are not ashamed to have been an age-long patient people.  We continue 
willingly to sacrifice and strive.  But we are unwilling to starve any longer while 
doing the world‟s drudgery, in order to support by our poverty and ignorance a false 
aristocracy and a discarded imperialism” (Mutiso & Rohio, 1975: 355). 
 
Sixty four years after this Resolution the poverty in Africa is deepening.  Though 
preventable in our time, poverty in Africa is quantitatively more deadly than it was in 1945.  
Poverty is now the wealth of many African nations (Landes 1999) attracting many expert 
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solutions on how to end it. (Hertz Stiglitz: 2002; Sachs 2005; Easterly: 2006).  Some 
increase in the number of educated Africans continues to be challenged by the 
disproportionately large number of uneducated Africans. It would seem that the attainment 
of independence in Africa failed to kill and bury the “false aristocracy and a discarded 
imperialism” referred to in the Manchester Resolution. The difference between colonial 
and post-colonial Africa appears to be primarily a change of name clothing Africa in 
borrowed robes (Fanon, 1968) while leaving intact the basic mechanisms that continue to 
assure the structural, systemic and systematic impoverishment of Africa today. The slide of 
Africa into this condition of deadly but preventable poverty calls into question the meaning 
of education in colonial and post-colonial Africa. The examination of these issues shall 
proceed from the point of view of African philosophy. 
“The idea of „African philosophy‟ as a field of inquiry thus has its contemporary 
roots in the effort of African thinkers to combat political and economic 
exploitations, and to examine, question, and contest identities imposed upon them 
by Europeans. The claims and counter-claims, justifications, and alienations that 
characterize such historical and conceptual protests and contestations indelibly 
mark the discipline of African philosophy. … African philosophy labors under this 
yet-to-end exploitation and denigration of African humanity. … Scribing the „post‟ 
of the postcolonial under erasure or brackets serves as a signal and pointer to the (in 
many parts of Africa) unfulfilled dreams of the independence achievements of the 
1960s”. (Eze, 1997: 11-12 and 14). 
 
Critics of African philosophy understood in terms of the above citation claim that it 
is futile to look to the past and then apportion blame on the successors in title to the 
benefits of the injustice of colonialism. The critics must be reminded that the injustice of 
colonialism resides distinctively in the fact that it was the unprovoked use of violence 
infringing and undermining all the principles of the just war doctrine (Russell, 1975).  In 
terms of this doctrine, colonialism – despite its hallowed claim to proselytisation 
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(Mudimbe, 1988: 45) and “civilization” – was an act of unjustified use of violence. It was 
fundamentally an injustice to the colonized and so are its ensuing consequences.  
Furthermore, the same critics of African philosophy are silent on the abolition of 
history as an academic discipline in their own countries on the ground that its focus is upon 
the past. Neither do they urge for the permanent erasure from memory of dates that are 
regarded as landmarks in their rise to nation-statehood. Nor do they campaign for the total 
oblivion and removal from their calendar of Easter and Christmas dates. Among those of 
them who have children, few would care to rebuke their children for wishing them a happy 
birthday.  
Could christianity (Soyinka, 1999: 32) survive if it dared to forget that Jesus was 
ever born and that he left the message, “do this in memory of me”?  In the christian liturgy 
this message is recalled at the highest point of the Holy Mass, namely, the consecration of 
the unleavened bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ.
2
  A Christian theological 
understanding of this consecration the living Christ is once again present in an absent way 
to community of faith constituting his church.  The church understood in this way is thus 
the mystical body of Christ.  “Because of the bond which unites us to one another in the 
Mystical Body, all of us, though not personally responsible and without encroaching on the 
judgement of God who alone knows every heart, bear the burden of the errors and faults of 
those who have gone before us” (John Paul II, Incarnationis Mysterium, 11).  And so it is 
                                                 
2
 We take the view, like Wole Soyinka, that the “convention that capitalizes this [christianity, christian] and 
other so-called world religions is justified only when the same principle is applied to other religions, among 
them, the Orisa”. (page 32) Accordingly, we will in the main use the small letter “c” for christianity/christian 
including reference to the “God” of this religion. Where capitalization is used it will be in inverted commas. 
The use of capital or small letters with reference to all religions and their respective gods is intended to 
eliminate the implicit hierarchy and, thus the putative superiority of some religions and their “gods” over all 
the other religions of the world.  Soyinka, W., (1999) The burden of memory, the muse of forgiveness, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
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that even christians may not escape personal responsibility for the injustice of colonialism 
on the plea that the injustice occurred in the past long before they were born.  It is this 
particular insight of the christian faith and doctrine which elevates the moral sensitivity of 
the Germany of Konrad Adenauer to the status of the sublime and the noble.  It was Konrad 
Adenauer who agreed to commit even the unborn German to pay reparations to Israel 
because of the Holocaust (Honig, 1954). 
Memory then can play a vital role in the expiation of guilt and the attainment of 
genuine reconciliation. Memory that aims to reveal the truth is a reliable means towards the 
liberation of the wrongdoer and the wronged.  “In order to be able to entrust the full truth 
about the past to God‟s mercy we must acknowledge our guilt and ask for forgiveness. This 
way, exoneration becomes liberation. …  The memory of a committed wrong subsequently 
confessed in an act of repentance stops being a paralyzing, traumatic burden” (Czajkowski, 
2001: 48-49).  No wonder then that Jesus attached crucial importance to memory as so 
many philosophers have done and continue to do. (Ricoeur: 2004). 
To argue that Africa should forget about her colonial past is to uphold the biological 
impossibility that a child can be older than its parent.  It is prevarication designed to 
postpone into the indefinite future the exigencies of natural and historical justice that is due 
to the indigenous conquered peoples at the dawn of the unjust wars of colonization.  The 
fact that the effects of colonization are alive and vibrant in contemporary postcolonial 
Africa is a living indictment against the advocates of “forget about the past”. 
In the beginning there was experience 
For philosophy of perception, the human body is the medium of insertion into the 
world and it is simultaneously the means of interaction with the world. (Ponty, 1962; 
6 
 
 
Zaner, 1964; Dewey, 1958).  Language, including body language, is the manifestation of 
the interaction of the body with the world.  This in a nutshell is the definition of experience 
from which springs ordinary knowledge (commonsense) of why things happen or are done 
and how they should be done. It is in this sense that experience is the source of knowledge.  
The next level in the architecture of knowledge is to change ordinary knowledge into 
scientific knowledge. This is the reconstruction of commonsense according to 
conventionally accepted specific criteria for the construction of scientific knowledge.  “The 
conclusions of science are the fruits of an institutionalized system of inquiry which plays 
an increasingly important role in the lives of men” (Nagel, 1961: 14)  
In the construction of scientific knowledge the inclusion or exclusion of certain 
elements of commonsense takes place.  It is precisely this principle of inclusion or 
exclusion which gives rise to the challenge of the three pillars of scientific knowledge, 
namely, neutrality, objectivity and universal applicability.  Examples to this challenge are 
indigenous knowledge systems, theology of liberation, philosophy of liberation (Bondy, 
1986; Dussel,1985; Roig, 1986) and feminist epistemology.  
From this perspective the construction of scientific knowledge is a veritable 
instance of learning from experience.  It is an instance of learning something but not 
everything acquired from experience.  Accordingly, there is an in-built element of 
fallibility in scientific knowledge.  Scientific knowledge that denies fallibility is not true 
science but dogma.  As such it precludes the search for truth since it claims to already 
possess the truth.  The challenges emanating from indigenous knowledge systems, theology 
of liberation, philosophy of liberation and feminist epistemology are directed at this 
dogmatic claim to truth. 
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On this reasoning, learning from experience comprises of two levels.  The levels of 
commonsense knowledge and scientific knowledge.  The former is informal and the latter 
formal.  Experience is the source of both levels of knowledge.  These levels share in 
common the fact that the insights and knowledge drawn from experience are used to 
understand and cope with life.  Use here also means being inspired to make continual 
improvement and amelioration of the living conditions.  Understanding speaks to the grasp 
and appreciation of values, spirituality, culture and aesthetics.  Understanding and 
insightful use of knowledge acquired from experience complement each other.  This is 
what we mean by inspired learning.  It is learning which commonsense and scientific 
knowledge have in common. 
And then there was conquest 
Colonialism claimed the questionable (Ramose, 2003: 463-64) “right of conquest” 
over the indigenous conquered peoples.  By virtue of this questionable right colonialism 
imposed unilaterally and by force upon the indigenous conquered peoples its own meaning 
of experience, knowledge and truth.  In this way, indigenous ways of knowing and doing 
were either forbidden, suppressed or eliminated.  Thus colonialism committed 
epistemicide, the killing of the epistemology and praxis of the indigenous conquered 
peoples.  It did so in the name of the christianisation and “civilization” of the indigenous 
conquered peoples.  It introduced “education” to pursue the aim of “civilization”.  And so 
the colonized were forced to aspire for “education” objectively designed to denigrate their 
own understanding of the meaning of experience, knowledge and truth.  Chinua Achebe‟s 
celebrated novel, Things Fall Apart, captures the essence of this epistemicide which failed 
to kill totally and completely the indigenous ways of knowing and doing.  Cognitive 
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dissonance and inferiority complex were implanted in the consciousness of the indigenous 
conquered peoples through “education”.  It was “education” for servitude containing within 
itself the seeds of resistance by the indigenous conquered peoples. 
For the British conquered territories and, to a large extent the territories conquered 
by France, Spain and Portugal the kind of “education” imposed upon the indigenous 
conquered peoples may aptly be described as liberal education. 
“Education, or the part of overall education which counts as liberal education, on 
the view being considered consists in initiating students into disciplines such as 
those of mathematics, science, history, literature and the arts. These disciplines exist 
in their own right, and there are people expert and authoritative in them. Students 
are to be taught by teachers who have some claim to authority in what they teach. 
All involved, students and teachers, are to be guided by the standards of excellence 
inherent in the disciplines concerned, wherever these standards might lead, even 
into conflict with church or state. It follows from this commitment to excellence 
that the disciplines are essentially open, and not to be closed to any competent voice 
by people either inside or outside the discipline. … Liberal education, then, is not 
primarily vocational or practical. Finally, it recognizes expertise, and works through 
the recognition of expertise and strives ultimately for work of exceptional quality in 
the subjects concerned, which by definition is not generally attainable” (O‟Hear, 
1981: 4-5). 
 
It is this kind of liberal education that was initially implanted into South Africa at 
colonial conquest. The evolution of liberal education, embodied in schools and universities 
in South Africa, is inextricably linked with the history of the colonization of the country. 
The rise of universities in South Africa was the initiative – and, by virtue of the 
questionable “right of conquest” – the prerogative of the colonialists. Accordingly, the 
inspiration, intention as well as the constitution of universities in South Africa derived from 
the epistemological paradigm of the colonial conqueror. (Phillips, 2003: 123) The 
dominance and exclusivity of the epistemological paradigm of the conqueror is also 
evidenced by the fact that the rise of scientific institutions in the country is reported as the 
sole effort of the colonial conqueror (Naude & Brown, 1977: 60-85).  Having thus 
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established epistemological dominance by virtue of which the colonized were reduced to 
consumers rather than producers of knowledge, the colonizer moulded the university in 
Africa into a transmission belt for the import and distribution of colonial values and goods. 
(Mazrui, 1984: 273-75) By the same token, the university in Africa was moulded into the 
facilitator of the export of African material and intellectual wealth to the erstwhile 
colonizing power. (Hountondji, 2003: 502) To date Africa is not relieved of this burden of 
epistemological oppression and subservience to the interests of the erstwhile colonial 
power. (Gbegnon, 1998: 27) The university in Africa today is not in a position to pursue 
African interests above those of anyone else. (Odora-Hoppers, 2000: 7) Despite the 
enduring burden of epistemological dominance, intellectual oppression and sustained 
structural and systemic material impoverishment, the university in Africa also produced 
African leaders of the struggle for independence and liberation. It continues to do so in the 
postcolonial era.  The remarks contained in the preceding paragraph pertain to  
… the globalization of African scholarship and the Africanisation of global 
scholarship. …  Assaulted for centuries by European racial and epistemic violence, 
it is not surprising that Africans in the diaspora, rather than those on the continent, 
were the first to launch protracted and passionate struggles for epistemological and 
political liberation, in which the vindication of Africa, as a human and historical 
space, was central. To be sure, there were those who reproduced the narratives of 
derision, who yearned for unconditional assimilation and Africa‟s erasure from their 
memories and bodies. And even among those who longed for Africa‟s redemption 
many had internalized the civilisational binaries of the Western epistemological 
order and they believed Africa would only be liberated from its current 
backwardness by the „modernised‟ diaspora returning to the „backward‟ 
motherland. Notwithstanding such ambiguities, or even contradictions, so well-
noted by several commentators …, the vindicationist tradition, …, sought to 
emancipate African societies and cultures from the cognitive and colonial 
apparatuses of European imperialism, a struggle that still continues. It is quite 
remarkable, indeed, how little the defamations and defences of Africa have changed 
since the late nineteenth century, a tribute to the enduring power of Eurocentricism, 
thanks to Western hegemony in the world capitalist system, and a sobering 
reminder that the struggles to liberate Africans at home and abroad must continue”. 
(Zeleza, 2007: 86 and 94). 
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These are insightful but no less provocative observations. The strictures of space preclude a 
detailed critical analysis of the remarks. Suffice it to state that Zeleza‟s claim that the 
diaspora were “the first” is more than dubious. 
The contemporary context of education 
The “individualist turn” in education marks a change of perspective in liberal 
education. It speaks to the emphasis on the instrumentalist character of education. It is the 
summer of the marketization of education and the marketization of the learner (Bridges and 
Jonathan, 2003: 136-44).  It is the season of education as a means to make money through 
finding a job. It is the spirit of willful indifference to the warning in Pope John Paul II‟s 
Laboren Exercens that in our time there is no automatic connection between an educational 
qualification and the finding of employment. It manifests the capitulation of „learning for 
its own sake‟ and „excellence‟ to the imperatives and directives of money. It is the 
recognition of the sovereignty of money transforming democracy and ushering in the new 
age of tymocracy, that is, a money-based system of governance and undermining respect 
for governmental authority and delegitimizing the government‟s right to rule. (Singer, 
2003: 226) This new age was predicted laconically forty eight years ago by President 
Eisenhower when on January 17
th
 1961 he issued the insightful warning that: “In the 
councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, 
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the 
disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist”. Evidence of the persistence is 
the wanton environmental destruction paying more lip service to the Rio and Kyoto 
Accords; the irrationality of the ever-present threat of nuclear omnicide (Schell, 1998); the 
global massive retrenchments of employees and the rising diffidence in the local and 
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international banking systems. All this points to the absolute sovereignty of money in our 
time: tymocratic governance demonstrating the powerlessness of the wealthiest of the 
wealthy to liberate themselves from the grip of voluntary enslavement to money. And so 
we are reminded of President JF Kennedy timely and wise warning that: “If a free society 
cannot save the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich”. And so by some 
irony of history we are back today to the rule of money in ancient Greece: 
Even the reciprocity of friendship seems to depend on money. … Money has 
become a distinct basic value that is implicitly or explicitly compared to other basic 
values such as birth or virtue or justice. The basic values of money and justice are 
obviously distinct, because money is often obtained precisely through injustice. … 
But in fact it is money that is honoured most. In choosing a spouse people put 
money above birth and reputation. For the mass of humankind the only virtue is 
money, compared to which self-control, knowledge, rhetoric, speed of foot are of 
no account, for money has the greatest power. … Solon himself, who was the first 
to point to the unlimited desire for wealth, also insists that there are limits to its 
desirability and its power. … When Socrates is told that he should charge a price 
for his valuable conversation, as he would if parting with other valuable things, he 
replies that just as charging for physical beauty is prostitution, so too wisdom 
should not be exchanged for money” (Seaford, 2004: 161-62). 
 
Through successive and qualitatively different stages of education humanity has 
certainly discovered and utilized sources and means for the amelioration of its living 
conditions.  Paradoxically, this long march across the centuries seems to be a kind of frozen 
immobility sustained by reason‟s will to self-destruction.  On balance it seems that 
irrational self-destruction in the name of money is the heritage of humanity from education. 
It is education without learning from experience.  We are in the phase of uninspired 
learning in the age of education. 
Our current traditions and institutions of learning, when judged from the standpoint 
of helping us learn how to become more enlightened, are defective and irrational in 
a wholesale and structural way, and it is this which, in the long term, sabotages our 
efforts to create a more civilized world, and prevents us from avoiding the kind of 
horrors we have been exposed to during the twentieth century – wars, third-world 
poverty, environmental degradation (Maxwell. 2000: 31). 
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Feta Kgomo o tshware motho – towards “a more civilized world” 
The constitution of the “new” South Africa entrenched the dominance of the 
colonial paradigm of education.  This despite the much acclaimed sensitivity to and human 
rights provisions in the constitution.  The present author has argued this work in some of 
his works and will not repeat the arguments here.  Suffice it to state that the philosophical 
and ideological link between the former conquerors of South Africa, that is, the successors 
in title to colonial conquest and its ensuing privileges, readily succumbed to the 
marketization of education and learning.  The effects of this process is the revival and 
intensification of the need for the „globalisation of African scholarship and the 
Africanisation of global scholarship‟ thereby establishing an African epistemic presence in 
the conduct of human affairs locally and internationally. It is against this background that 
we suggest the adoption and implementation of one of the principles of ubuntu ethics, 
namely, feta kgomo o tshware motho. The present author has written elaborately on the 
experience and concept of ubuntu and its practical implications. (Ramose: 1999)  
Accordingly, he will eschew some pertinent details on the subject.  The philosophy 
and practice of ubuntu can contribute towards the construction of learning inspired 
education intended to humanize and human relations and render our common planet “a 
more civilized world”.  This can be done through the invocation of the ethical principle of 
feta kgomo o tshware motho. Kgomo is the singular for dikgomo which means cattle and 
motho or umuntu means a human being.  Cattle in many African cultures were the symbol 
and reality of wealth.  The challenge of this ethical principle is that whenever we are 
confronted with a choice between protecting our wealth and saving and preserving human 
life then the wise choice is the saving and the preservation of human life.  The option for 
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human life is thus placed priceless above wealth or money.  Learning to live this choice in 
our time is one of the ways through which we can overcome the deadly and irrational 
sovereignty of money.  Learning inspired education is available from and through this 
ethical principle of ubuntu philosophy. 
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